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1. INTRODUCTION
The commentary acknowledges that my dialogical analysis of rhetorical texts, that is
of larger sequences of uninterrupted one-way communication from an orator to a
passive audience is basically convincing. Yet it argues that my analysis proceeds
from untenable starting points, especially because it allegedly imputes to the
pragma-dialectical model an entirely dialogical conception of argument.
2. PRAGMA-DIALECTICS AND ‘MONOLOGUES’
As far as pragma-dialectics is concerned, I admit that I may perhaps have forced an
open door. It can’t be denied that even before the introduction of strategic
maneuvering as an additional, rhetorically based element to the pragma-dialectical
model, by introducing the term “implicit discussion,” pragma-dialectical theory had
always basically allowed for its application to what they call ‘monologues.’ Yet this
does not disprove that the model as such continues to be essentially dialectical,
since it maintains that even in such texts the argumentative discourse can always be
reconstructed as a dialogue. I do not deny this; in fact this is what I have tried to do
in my paper. As a matter of fact, the commentary itself admits that “their theory still
has a dialectical basis,” and the quotation from van Eemeren (2012, p. 446)
explicitly speaks of the persistence of “a dialectical framework of analysis.”
Yet apart from pragma-dialectics it can hardly be denied that Ralph Johnson’s
and Douglas Walton’s theories of argument in particular are very strongly dialectical
(Johnson, 2000; Walton, 1996), far more so than the pragma-dialectical model.
Walton insists on the presence of the “context of a dialogue” for there to be an
argument (Walton, 1996, pp. 41). Hence it may have been Walton’s theory more so
than van Eemeren’s that provoked Blair’s concept of ‘solo arguments’ (Blair, 1998, p.
333), which I found helpful in bridging the gap between the outwardly monological
appearance of rhetorical argumentation and its hidden dialogical structure.
3. DIALECTICAL VS. DIALOGICAL
I fully admit, however, that my argument is at times guilty of using the terms
‘dialectical’ and ‘dialogical’ quite as interchangeably as has rightly been criticized by
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-2.
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Blair. I agree that ‘dialectical’ should be reserved for “the properties of all arguments
related to their involving doubts and disagreements”, and ‘dialogical’ to “turn-taking
verbal exchanges” (Blair, 1998, p. 337). Had I been more consistent in keeping those
two terms apart, it might have turned out as a simple result that rhetorical
argumentation is just not dialogical, but still basically dialectical.
4. CONCLUSION
All this considered, while I do accept part of the commentary’s criticism, I find little
reason to retract my analysis of rhetorical argumentation as inadequate.
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